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CIA, PHOTOGRAPHIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

8 July 1965

PI NOTES, A PUBLICATION OF CIA/IMAGERY ANALYSIS DIVISION (FORMERLY PHOTOGRAPHIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION), HIGHLIGHTS SIGNIFICANT INTELLIGENCE ITEMS DERIVED FROM PHOTOGRAPHY, AS WELL AS CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE "PI" FIELD.

P.I. NOTES 1/66.

With the start of FY-66 the CIA/Photographic Intelligence Division (CIA/PID) was renamed the CIA/Imagery Analysis Division (CIA/IAD). By such a change a more meaningful division name is established in recognition of the [redacted] enveloping us.

Due to the press of business "PI NOTES" was not issued for the week of 1 July. This issue covers a two week period.

IN THE INTEREST OF ECONOMY

For info of our requesters may we point out the following. During calendar year 1964, non-report graphics and those ordered in addition to standard distribution (duplicate positives, vugraphs, enlargements, stereograms, etc) to the amount of some [redacted] were ordered by agency requesters. The bulk of such graphics were requested by two divisions in ORR and three divisions in OSI. One requirement currently being filled amounts to over [redacted]. As a guide in considering orders for graphics, sample costs are as follows:

enlargements (20"x24")
contact prints (8"x10")
dupe positives (8"x10")
vugraphs (8"x10")
lantern slides (4"x5")

These costs represent lab time and material costs only. The sample costs do not include time required to handle the requirement, preparation of photo order, PI time, etc.

We are suggesting that the costs involved in ordering non-report or non-standard distribution graphics should be considered just as in placing any order for material or equipment.

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CIA, PHOTOGRAPHIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION [REDACTED]

GEO-MILITARY BRANCH

At least 60 possible parachutes were observed stretched out on the ground adjacent to the bivouac area at Tula Army Barracks, Kostrovo, Moscow Military District, USSR [REDACTED]

NOTE: COMINT carries the 106th Guards Airborne Rifle Division in the Tula/Ryazan Area. [REDACTED]

At least 25 possible parachutes were observed extended parallel to one another on the ground in an area immediately west of the hangar facilities at the Belogorsk Airfield, Far East Military District, USSR [REDACTED] Photography also reveals a probable aircraft mock-up and three static aircraft displays in different areas in the Belogorsk Complex.

NOTE: COMINT carries the 98th Guards Airborne Rifle Division at Belogorsk. [REDACTED]

MISSILE/ELECTRONICS BRANCH

Probable Presence of Exhaust Ports at Type III ICBM Launch Sites:

Analysis of isodensimetric traces of open Type III-A and III-C Soviet ICBM silos imaged on [REDACTED] photography has revealed density differences, previously undetected, which are interpreted to be covers placed over rectangular exhaust ports. Similar irregularities in density were detected at open silos at Verkhnyaya Salda Launch Area F [REDACTED] Drovyanaya Launch Area E [REDACTED], both Type III-A Sites, and at Tyuratam Launch Area B-2 [REDACTED], the first Type III-C single silo to be completed.

The location of these probable vents is such that they would have been shielded from view by the ramps leading to the silo when the installations were under construction.

The use of the isodensimetric technique makes possible differentiation of subtle density differences not detectable by the human eye. [REDACTED]

Propaganda Broadcasting Stations:

A large HF communications facility, like Soviet designed facilities used for propaganda purposes, is under construction near Havana, Cuba. The antennas are so oriented to give maximum coverage of Mexico and Central and South America.

A similar facility has been constructed near Alexandria, Egypt and its transmissions blanket all of Central and South Africa. [REDACTED]

17 SEP 1965

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SAM Guidance Equipment:

Examination of the Dalnyaya SA-2 SAM Site on Sakhalin Island has revealed an extra electronics-type van with possible antenna, in the central guidance revetment. This additional equipment may be the source of the BFFM signal which has been emanating from this site since 1 December 1964. The Dalnyaya Site achieved notice during October 1964, when a Guideline missile was fired from this site at a Navy reconnaissance plane and closed on the aircraft at a reported altitude of approximately 500 feet at an approximate range of 17 mm.

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Surface-To-Air Missile Deployment:

Recent identification of five SAM installations on Sakhalin Island have increased the total of such installations on the island to nineteen. Included in this total are one possible SA-3 site, one probable SA-2 site and one probable support facility.

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To date, SAM installations in India include seven SA-2 sites, three support facilities and one training site. These are located at 3 areas: Baroda, Chandigarh, and New Dehli

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INDUSTRIAL BRANCH

Kunlong Bridge Construction, Burma:

Continued analysis of Mission [redacted] reveals that the long awaited construction of a highway bridge over the Salween River (23 25N - 98 39E) at Kunlong, Burma has begun. It appears to be designed as a heavy-duty, suspension-type bridge. Construction of the two major piers is well advanced.

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Completion of this bridge and the roads connecting it with the Chinese and Burmese networks will add a new and important logistical supply route between the two countries.

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DID YOU KNOW?

That IAD is set up to service the needs of requesters who do not have T-KH clearances. Considerable photography, both aerial and ground, exists which may meet the needs of agency non-system cleared requesters. Personnel lacking T-KH clearances may visit the IAD area in Building [redacted] simply by calling in advance on any of the following extensions:

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CIA IMAGERY ANALYSIS DIVISION

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P.I. NOTES 3/66

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Continued analysis on bombed railroad lines in North Vietnam reveals that the Vietnamese are now beginning to rehabilitate their bomb damaged railroads. The first such evidence appeared at the Thanh Hoa Bridge. Here the approaches have been rehabilitated and the roadbed and track structure apparently has been put back in operating condition. Other evidence includes the reconstruction of bombed sections of the lines and the construction of a temporary rail bridge at Qui Vinh.

25X1

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Clear stereo coverage of the Uzhur ICBM Complex on [redacted] mission [redacted] has revealed the presence of cable scarring inter-connecting the "L" shaped interferometer at Launch Area B with at least 5 and probably 7 of the single silos at the complex. It can be concluded from this evidence that one interferometer will serve at least six Type III-C Silos instead of three as previously estimated.

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The current count of confirmed and probable ICBM launchers at the 25 deployed launch complexes including those under construction, totals 370. These are broken down by missile systems as follows:

Missile System/Launch Area Configuration	Number of Launch Sites	Launchers Per Site	Total Launch Positions By Type	Total Launchers
SS-6 I A	4	1	4	4
SS-7/9 II A	5	2	10	
II B	29	2	58	
II D	30	2	60	
III A	23	3	69	197
SS-8 II C	7	2	14	
III B	3	3	9	23
Large Single Silos/III C	52	1	52	52
Small Single Silos/III D	94	1	94	94
Totals	247	-	370	370

In addition there are 49 launch positions at the Tyuratam Missile Test Center (either complete or under construction) and 6 SSM launchers of undetermined function at the Plesetsk ICBM Complex.

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Further analysis [] reveals a probable SCUD missile unit located in a double-secured area immediately east of Mary North Airfield in the Turkestan Military District. This is the first time such a unit has been identified on photography. Equipment observed consists of three probable SCUD transporters (of the type observed in the [] Tashkent parade), two probable MAZ 200V tractor-trailers, two cranes, one suspect crane, five probable generator trailers, four probable van trucks, 13 cargo trucks and six other vehicles/pieces of equipment. A separately wall-secured area within the double-secured compound contains an equipment shed. Four shadows caused by equipment parked within the shed are observed (this shed is large enough to accommodate transporter-erector-launchers). Shadows from other vehicles and/or pieces of equipment parked in sheds are also observed. []

25X1

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-2-

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Further analysis [] reveals a probable airborne unit in a barracks area adjacent to Novo-Aleksandrovsk (Konuma) Airfield. On the [] coverage the following were observed: a barracks area consisting of 30 barracks, two equipment storage/maintenance areas containing eight vehicle sheds and one probable vehicle maintenance building, two driver training areas containing three figure-8 driver training circuits, and approximately 100 additional buildings. Two HOUNDS, 14 HARES and four MAX (low-wing trainers) were observed on this coverage.

Fighter-type aircraft were last observed at this airfield on photography dated []. Nine possible helicopters were observed on [] coverage. Fourteen possible helicopters were observed on the [] coverage. []

The identification of two SA-3 Assembly Facilities in the USSR has increased to ten, the number of these installations identified to date. Each of the ten facilities is located within an area of high SA-3 Site concentration and in most instances is located adjacent to an SA-2 SAM Support Facility. Each SA-3 assembly facility consists of a probable second stage (sustainer) storage and assembly building, a drive-through assembly building, and a small probable component storage building. Several additional buildings are present in some instances. To date, these facilities have been identified near Artem, Kaliningrad, Murmansk, Palanga, Petropavlovsk-Kamchatskiy, Plesetsk, Severodvinsk, Ussuriysk, and two have been identified in the Moscow area. []

Tallinn-type launch areas at Sary Shagan Antimissile Test Center (reported in [] OAK [] are believed to utilize two BACK NET and two SIDE NET radars for target tracking. The target tracking site for the Tallinn-type launch area at Launch Complex A is located 4.9 nm NE of the launch area and consists of two BACK NET radars and two SIDE NET radars on mounds and a centrally located vehicle revetment containing two rows of vehicles/vans. The target tracking site for the Tallinn-type launch area near the main support base is located 2.6 nm NW of the launch area and consists of four radar mounds, one supporting a SIDE NET radar and three mounds vacant, and a centrally located vehicle revetment containing two rows of vehicles/vans. The target tracking sites for both launch areas appear nearly identical. The Tallinn-type R&D Launch Facilities at Complex A Electronic Site B consists of three guidance radars and a TALL KING radar; at Electronics Site F, two BACK NET and two SIDE NET radars. The location and orientation of the launch areas does not indicate an R & D role, thus suggesting an operational air defense mission. The total number of launch positions (12 at Complex A and 18 near the Main Support Base) equates to a complete operational complex, and appears excessive for an antisatellite role. The presence of associated target tracking radar sites further supports an air defense mission. []

-3-

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